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ONE MERGER, TWO AGENCIES: DUAL 
REVIEW IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE 
AT&T/T-MOBILE MERGER AND A 
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Abstract: Mergers in the telecommunications industry are unique be-
cause they are reviewed by not one, but two federal agencies. Mergers in 
most industries are subject only to antitrust review by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ). Telecommunications mergers, however, are also 
reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under its 
flexible public interest standard. This system of dual review causes delay, 
redundancy, and a perversion of antitrust and telecommunications law. 
This Note examines the system of dual review through the lens of the 
AT&T/T-Mobile merger, which was proposed and eventually abandoned 
in 2011. After outlining the historical development and statutory author-
ity for dual review, the Note demonstrates how dual review altered the 
DOJ’s typical burden structure in its attempt to block the AT&T/T-Mobile 
merger. Finally, the Note presents a proposal for reform to the FCC’s re-
view, arguing for a significant limitation in scope and the imposition of a 
strict time limit. 
Introduction 
 On March 20, 2011, two of the four largest U.S. wireless telephone 
companies, AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) and T-Mobile USA (“T-Mobile”), an-
nounced their intention to merge.1 The merger proposal instigated a 
heated debate among the public and within the government, ultimately 
leading to the implosion of the deal.2 Putting aside the merits of the 
proposed merger, AT&T and T-Mobile’s experience has broad implica-
tions for governmental review of mergers in the telecommunications 
industry.3 AT&T and T-Mobile needed approval from both the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Com-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Press Release, AT&T Inc., AT&T to Acquire T-Mobile USA from Deutsche Tele-
kom (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=19358&cdvn=news&news 
articleid=31703 [hereinafter AT&T News Release]. 
2 See infra notes 242–246 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 237–253 and accompanying text. 
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mission (FCC) before they could move forward with the deal.4 All tele-
communications mergers are subject to review by the DOJ and the 
FCC—each agency analyzes the impact of the merger under different 
legal standards, different burdens of proof, and different policy guide-
lines.5 The result is a system of delay, redundancy, and inefficiency.6 
This Note examines the system of dual review through the lens of the 
AT&T/T-Mobile merger, highlighting the relative ease with which the 
DOJ can challenge mergers in the telecommunications industry, com-
pared to mergers in other industries.7 Although in most industries the 
DOJ must make an evidentiary showing at a preliminary injunction 
hearing, the dual review by the FCC eliminates this requirement in the 
telecommunications context.8 This Note does not pass judgment on 
whether the AT&T/T-Mobile merger should have been approved, nor 
does it comment on the appropriate methodology for governmental 
merger scrutiny.9 It merely seeks to highlight the inconsistencies 
caused by dual review and the way that these inconsistencies under-
mine and pervert the application of current antitrust policy.10 
                                                                                                                      
4 Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., AT&T Makes Deal to Buy T-Mobile for $39 Billion, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 21, 2011, at A1. 
5 Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of 
FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. Chi. Legal F. 29, 30–31, 41, 49. 
6 See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the 
FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 CommLaw Conspectus 
195, 205–06 (1998). 
7 See infra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
8 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and Eco-
nomics 587 (2d ed. 2011). A preliminary injunction can become relevant in any type of 
legal case, and is defined as “a temporary injunction issued before or during trial to pre-
vent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the 
case.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 855 (9th ed. 2009). 
9 See Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass’n., Mergers and Acquisitions: Un-
derstanding the Antitrust Issues 358 (Robert S. Schlossberg & Clifford H. Aronson 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Mergers and Acquisitions] (outlining the preliminary injunc-
tion standard); Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38 (explaining that the Clayton Act favors 
the free market and places the burden on the government); Donald J. Russell & Sherri 
Lynn Wolson, Dual Antitrust Review of Telecommunications Mergers by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 143, 151 (2002) (speak-
ing to the costs of dual review); infra notes 159–374 and accompanying text (arguing that 
the dual review of telecommunications mergers perverts the application of antitrust law 
and, accordingly, that FCC authority in this arena must be curtailed). 
10 Compare Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order at 4, 
United States. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., No. 1:02CV02138 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2002) (de-
clining to seek a preliminary injunction), with Motion of United States for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1–4, United States v. Suiza Foods Corp., No. 99-CV-130 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 
1999) (seeking a preliminary injunction). 
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 Part I of this Note outlines the development and current operation 
of the dual review system, focusing first on the DOJ and then on the 
FCC.11 Part II begins by using the AT&T/T-Mobile merger to demon-
strate the DOJ’s ability to stall telecommunications mergers without 
seeking a preliminary injunction.12 It then discusses the inefficiencies 
created by this preliminary injunction problem.13 Finally, Part III out-
lines four approaches to addressing this problem, and concludes that 
severely limiting the substance of FCC merger review and imposing a 
strict time limit on this review offers the best solution.14 
I. DOJ & FCC Dual Review of Telecommunications Mergers 
 Before the merger between AT&T and T-Mobile could move for-
ward, the parties needed the blessing of two federal agencies.15 Mergers 
between companies in the telecommunications industry are subject to 
review by the DOJ and the FCC.16 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ is 
the primary enforcer of the U.S. antitrust laws.17 The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”), granted the DOJ authority to review tel-
ecommunications mergers in the same way it reviews mergers in most 
other industries.18 Congress created the FCC in 1934 as an expert 
agency tasked with regulating a broad swath of telecommunications 
issues and technologies.19 It has the narrow authority to review mergers 
that implicate the transfer of licenses for the use of electromagnetic 
spectrum or common carriage wires.20 The two agencies conduct their 
merger review independently and without formal cooperation.21 As a 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 15–158 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 159–236 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 237–253 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 254–374 and accompanying text. 
15 Sorkin et al., supra note 4. 
16 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 29. 
17 Id. at 35–36. 
18 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 
143 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)). The 1996 Act repealed the FCC’s authority 
to exempt telecommunications mergers from antitrust review, which was previously grant-
ed pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 221(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1080 
(previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994)) (repealed 1996) (ensuring that, if the 
FCC decides to permit a merger to proceed, all other contrary acts of Congress are inap-
plicable). Congress thereby ensured the DOJ’s role in reviewing telecommunications mer-
gers going forward. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(b)(2). 
19 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
20 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006). 
21 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 35–48; William J. Rinner, Comment, Optimizing 
Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 118 Yale L.J. 1571, 1571 (2009). 
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result, a merger in the telecommunications industry is subject to review 
by both the DOJ and the FCC under differing standards.22 
 This Part outlines the history of and statutory basis for this concur-
rent review process.23 Section A focuses on the development of the 
DOJ’s authority to review mergers in general, and telecommunications 
mergers in particular.24 Section B discusses the procedure and relevant 
legal standard used by the DOJ to review mergers.25 Section C consid-
ers the history of the FCC and its authority to review mergers.26 Finally, 
Section D details the FCC’s procedural and legal standards for merger 
review.27 
A. History of Antitrust Regulation and the DOJ’s Statutory  
Merger Review Authority 
 From its origin in the late nineteenth century, antitrust law has 
aimed to police the free market, intervening only when necessary to 
prevent or remedy anticompetitive conduct.28 Federal antitrust policy 
began in 1890 when Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act.29 Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . 
or conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains trade, and it gives the gov-
ernment civil and criminal recourse.30 Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits monopolization and any attempts to monopolize.31 Congress 
intended for the government, acting through the Antitrust Division of 
the DOJ, to protect competitive markets by bringing actions to chal-
                                                                                                                      
22 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 30–31. 
23 See infra notes 28–158 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 28–50 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 51–82 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 83–133 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 134–158 and accompanying text. 
28 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 1; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 
38, 57; Raymond Z. Ling, Note, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing Divergence Be-
tween the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review After Whole Foods, 75 Brook. L. Rev. 935, 939 
(2010). 
29 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)); Matthew S. Bailey, Note, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: Needing a Second 
Opinion About Second Requests, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 433, 438 & n.23 (2006); Ling, supra note 28, 
at 939. 
30 15 U.S.C. § 1. Congress’s rationale for passing the Sherman Act is not completely 
clear. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and 
Its Practice 57–58 (4th ed. 2011). Scholars have cited the promotion of allocative effi-
ciency, just business practices, and viability of small farmers as possible impetuses for its 
passage. Id. at 58. What is clear, however, is that Congress intended antitrust standards to 
develop and change over time through adjudication in the courts. Id. at 65. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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lenge anticompetitive activity.32 The antitrust laws intervene only when 
necessary to eradicate anticompetitive behavior, restoring the market to 
its competitive status quo; antitrust laws do not seek to substantively 
improve the market or prices.33 
 Merger policy, a subset of antitrust policy, changed over time in 
response to the Sherman Act’s inability to address the growing volume 
of mergers.34 The number of mergers exploded during the period be-
tween 1895 and 1904, creating a need to strengthen the Sherman Act’s 
jurisdiction over mergers.35 Under the Sherman Act, the government 
could challenge a merger only by bringing an action alleging an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade or monopolization after the merger had been 
consummated.36 It was therefore very difficult for the government to 
challenge mergers under the Sherman Act.37 
 Congress responded to calls for reform by passing the Clayton Act, 
which declared the illegality of anticompetitive mergers to be a prob-
lem separate from the general anticompetitive behavior covered by the 
Sherman Act.38 The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, enumerated specific 
activities, such as mergers, over which the federal government has ju-
risdiction.39 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that 
                                                                                                                      
32 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 35–37. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ shares its 
Clayton Act merger review authority with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Mergers 
and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 13. The FTC was created by the FTC Act, passed in 
tandem with the Clayton Act in 1914. Id.; see Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (cur-
rent version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)); Federal Trade Commission 
Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 17 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 45 (giving the FTC authority to prevent “[u]nfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce”). 
33 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 36, 38; Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Ver-
sus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1627, 1628–30 
(2011). 
34 See Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 542; Bailey, supra note 29, at 444; Ling, supra note 
28, at 939–40. “A merger occurs when two firms that had been separate come under com-
mon ownership. . . . The antitrust laws also use the word ‘merger’ to describe a consolida-
tion: two original corporations cease to exist and a new corporation is formed that owns 
the assets of the two former corporations.” Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 541. Some schol-
ars have posited that the Sherman Act, by prohibiting informal relationships and combina-
tions among firms, actually encouraged mergers. Id. at 542. 
35 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 542. 
36 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006); Ling, supra note 28, at 939–40. 
37 Elhauge, supra note 8, at 585–86; Ling, supra note 28, at 940. 
38 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 730–40 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)). 
39 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7. 
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substantially lessen competition, has become the primary vehicle for 
federal government oversight of mergers.40 
 The Clayton Act, however, did not give the government the power 
it needed to prevent anticompetitive mergers before they occurred, and 
therefore the Act required further amendment.41 Under the Clayton 
Act as it stood in 1914, the government had specific authority to chal-
lenge unlawful mergers but had no way of knowing about or reviewing 
mergers before they went into effect; therefore, the DOJ typically had to 
wait until a merger was consummated to bring an action.42 Congress 
addressed this problem in 1976 by passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvement Act (“HSR Act”).43 The HSR Act enabled effective 
government enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act by providing 
for oversight and blockage of mergers before they were completed.44 
 This structure allows the DOJ to play a central role in the review, 
approval, and challenge of telecommunications mergers.45 The Anti-
trust Division of the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are 
the primary enforcers of the Clayton and HSR Acts, and, pursuant to 
this authority, review and challenge mergers across a wide range of in-
dustries.46 Ever since the enactment of the 1996 Act, the DOJ has re-
viewed telecommunications mergers as it does mergers in any other 
industry.47 When the parties to a proposed merger exceed enumerated 
size thresholds, which practically all parties to telecommunications 
mergers do, both are required to file for approval with the DOJ and the 
FTC before the merger may be consummated.48 After the initial notifi-
                                                                                                                      
 
40 Id.; Ling, supra note 28, at 940. Section 7 prohibits mergers in which “the effect of 
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
41 See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
42 Ling, supra note 28, at 940. 
43 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c–15h, 18a, 
66 (2006). 
44 Id.; Bailey, supra note 29, at 439–40. 
45 See infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 18–18a; 28 U.S.C. § 52 (2006). The DOJ and the FTC work together to 
allocate review for each merger between themselves. Mergers and Acquisitions, supra 
note 9, at 13–16. The DOJ is regarded as having more experience in telecommunications 
and therefore almost always reviews proposed mergers in the telecommunications indus-
try. Id. at 14. 
47 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 
143 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)); Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 37; infra 
notes 105–110 and accompanying text. 
48 15 U.S.C. § 18a; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 37–38; Ling, supra note 28, at 942. 
As summarized by one writer: 
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cation and report form is submitted to both agencies, the merger is 
cleared to one of the two agencies for further review.49 Mergers in the 
telecommunications industry are almost always assigned to the DOJ for 
investigation rather than the FTC; therefore, this Note focuses exclu-
sively on DOJ review.50 
B. DOJ Legal Standard and Procedure 
 The HSR Act outlines a complex procedure for merger review.51 
Once the proposed merger is assigned to the DOJ, the agency has thirty 
days to conduct an initial investigation, during which time consumma-
tion of the transaction is prohibited.52 If the DOJ is satisfied that the 
proposed merger does not violate the Clayton Act, the DOJ can note 
approval by either granting an early termination of the waiting period 
or allowing the thirty-day waiting period to expire.53 If, on the other 
hand, the DOJ believes that the merger may raise Clayton Act concerns, 
it can issue a request for additional information (“second request”).54 
After the parties have “substantially complied” with the second request, 
an additional thirty-day waiting period attaches for the DOJ to complete 
                                                                                                                      
[The HSR Act] requires premerger filing when: (1) at least one party to the 
transaction is engaged in commerce or an activity affecting commerce, and 
(2) when the size of the transaction exceeds $200 million (commonly known 
as the “size-of-transaction test”). When the size of the transaction does not ex-
ceed $200 million, but is in excess of $50 million, premerger filing is gener-
ally required if one party has at least $10 million in sales or assets, and the 
other party has at least $100 million in sales or assets—commonly referred to 
as the “size-of-person test.” 
Bailey, supra note 29, at 441. 
49 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 14. The FTC and the DOJ share au-
thority to enforce the antitrust laws. Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 143 n.1; Ling, supra 
note 28, at 943–44. In practice, however, each proposed merger will be cleared to a single 
agency for review, depending on the relative expertise and experience of each agency in 
that industry. Russell & Wolson, supra, at 143 n.1; Ling, supra note 28, at 943–44. 
50 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 14; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 
143 n.1; Ling, supra note 28, at 943–44. 
51 See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b) (2006); Bailey, supra note 29, at 442. The DOJ uses informa-
tion submitted in the initial notification and report form to conduct this initial investiga-
tion. Bailey, supra note 29, at 442. This form contains basic information on the structure of 
the proposed merger as well as financial information. Id. 
53 Ling, supra note 28, at 946. 
54 Id. The second request allows the DOJ to obtain extensive discovery to aid in its an-
titrust analysis. Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, The Merger Review Proc-
ess: A Step-by-Step Guide to Federal Merger Review 155 (Ilene K. Gotts ed., 2d ed. 
2001). Compliance with a second request is a time- and labor-intensive endeavor for the 
merging parties and takes an average of six months. Id; Bailey, supra note 29, at 453–55. 
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its review.55 At the end of this second thirty-day period, the DOJ must 
decide whether to approve the merger, pursue a voluntary agreement 
between the parties to alleviate its concerns, or file suit to block the 
merger.56 
 The DOJ’s analysis follows a predictable structure.57 The DOJ, in 
conjunction with the FTC, issues nonbinding internal guidelines that 
outline the analytical framework used by the agencies when determin-
ing whether a proposed merger may violate the Clayton Act.58 The 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide that a merger will be con-
sidered anticompetitive if it results in an increase in the merged firm’s 
market power.59 Market power is a measure of a firm’s ability to profit 
from raising prices above cost and is estimated by a firm’s market 
share.60 Typically, the DOJ will begin its analysis of market power by 
defining the relevant product and geographic markets.61 The defini-
tion of a relevant product market depends on whether a firm manufac-
tures products that the consumer views as substitutable.62 The relevant 
geographic market is defined as the geographic area where the firms 
compete directly over these substitutable products.63 
                                                                                                                      
55 Bailey, supra note 29, at 443; Ling, supra note 28, at 946. If the proposed transaction 
is a cash tender offer, however, the additional review period is only ten days. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 18a(e)(2). 
56 Ling, supra note 28, at 946. 
57 See infra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
58 U.S. DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter 
Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.pdf. 
59 Id. at 2. The Guidelines state: 
The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permit-
ted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise. . . . 
A merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms 
to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm custom-
ers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives. 
Id. The term “firm” as used in this context is a synonym for “company,” and is used to refer 
to an actual or hypothetical merging party. See id. 
60 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 89–91 (“Market power is a firm’s ability to deviate 
profitably from marginal cost pricing.”). 
61 David A. Curran, Rethinking Federal Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 28 Ohio 
N.U. L. Rev. 747, 752 (2002). 
62 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 101; Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 7 (“Mar-
ket definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and 
willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a price increase 
or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or service.”). 
Coca-Cola, for example, would likely be seen as a valid substitute for Pepsi, but Diet Pepsi 
likely would not. See id. 
63 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 123–24. 
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 The DOJ then weighs the anticompetitive effects against any miti-
gating factors to come to a decision.64 To measure the anticompetitive 
effects, the DOJ analyzes the market concentration within the identi-
fied relevant market before and after the proposed merger using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).65 A high market concentration 
suggests a high likelihood of collusion and anticompetitive concerns.66 
The DOJ then balances the estimated anticompetitive effects against 
any procompetitive effects of the merger and any mitigating factors 
such as created efficiencies or increased ease of entry.67 The DOJ’s 
analysis focuses on the immediate effect of the merger on the market at 
issue; it does not take into account long-term predictions of future 
competition.68 This analysis informs the DOJ’s decision to approve the 
merger or challenge it as a violation of the Clayton Act.69 
 If the DOJ believes the proposed merger would have a net anti-
competitive result and the parties cannot come to an agreement with 
the DOJ to remedy the anticompetitive elements, the DOJ will file suit 
in federal court to permanently enjoin the merger.70 The Clayton Act 
favors the free market; the burden therefore rests on the DOJ to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed merger is likely 
to substantially lessen competition.71 The DOJ’s determination that the 
proposed merger will be anticompetitive receives no deference from 
                                                                                                                      
64 See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
65 Curran, supra note 61, at 752. Market concentration is a measure of the number of 
firms and their respective market shares. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 18. 
“The HHI as used in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is the sum of the squares of every 
firm in the relevant market.” Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 566. The DOJ will also ex-
trapolate anticompetitive effects based on observed effects of recent similar mergers. 
Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3. 
66 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 35. The 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines set a score of 2500 on the HHI as the threshold for “high” market concentra-
tion, indicating anticompetitive effects. See Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 566. 
67 Curran, supra note 61, at 752. As one scholar explains, 
[a] barrier to entry is something that permits incumbents to price monopo-
listically for an unacceptable period of time before effective entry restores 
price and output to the competitive level. If barriers to entry are completely 
absent, any instance of monopoly pricing will result in immediate entry of 
sufficient magnitude to restore prices to the competitive level. 
Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 579. 
68 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 45–46. 
69 Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 1, 18–19; Ling, supra note 28, at 946. 
70 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. 
Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 159, 169. 
71 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38, 49. 
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the court.72 The burden placed on the DOJ comports with the over-
arching policy behind the antitrust laws: to presume that unhindered 
participation in the economy will result in a competitive and efficient 
atmosphere and that the government should intervene only if there is a 
clear showing of harm to consumers.73 
 While its case is pending, the DOJ will typically seek a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the merger from being consummated before tri-
al.74 In fact, cases are often won or lost at the preliminary injunction 
stage due to the high costs of trial.75 At preliminary injunction hear-
ings, the moving party must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of 
success at trial.76 Because the DOJ must show a likelihood of success on 
the merits, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is often pre-
dictive, if not conclusive, of the final result of the case.77 Therefore, the 
DOJ will often consolidate its claim for preliminary injunction and its 
claim for permanent injunction into the same action.78 
 Merger remedies, whether reached through negotiation or litiga-
tion, commonly take one of two forms: structural or behavioral.79 The 
most typical DOJ remedy is the structural divestiture of the portion of 
one merging company that competes directly with the other merging 
company.80 If the parties reach agreement through negotiation, the 
DOJ will issue a consent decree which commands substantial judicial 
deference.81 Alternatively, if the remedy is judicially mandated, the 
opinion is subject to full judicial review.82 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 49; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 147. 
73 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38, 49. 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 25; Frankel, supra note 70, at 169 n.37. 
75 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358. 
76 Id. at 371. A court will grant a preliminary injunction if the DOJ can demonstrate 
that: (1) consumers would suffer irreparable harm without the issuance of an injunction; 
(2) harm to the plaintiff would outweigh harm to the defendant if the injunction were 
granted; (3) the DOJ has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits at trial; and (4) 
issuing injunctive relief would comport with the public interest. Id. 
77 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358–60, 371; Ling, supra note 28, at 
947–48. 
78 Frankel, supra note 70, at 169 n.37. 
79 Ling, supra note 28, at 950. Structural remedies alter the makeup of the merging 
companies such that the premerger state of competition will be maintained. Id. Behavioral 
remedies, conversely, regulate the conduct of the newly merged company. Id. The DOJ 
prefers structural remedies because they do not require subsequent regulatory oversight. 
Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 147–48. 
82 Frankel, supra note 70, at 169. It is important to note, however, that appeals are fair-
ly rare, so these decisions are often final. Id. 
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C. History of Telecommunications Regulation and Statutory  
Authority for FCC Merger Review 
 In contrast to the DOJ’s antitrust review, the FCC’s review stems 
from a long history of heavy regulation of telecommunications to pro-
tect the public interest.83 The Communications Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) 
marked the beginning of a cohesive federal telecommunications policy 
in the United States.84 Prior to its passage, different agencies regulated 
each separate technology, leading to a disparate system of regulation.85 
The 1934 Act revolutionized telecommunications regulation by creating 
the FCC, an expert agency tasked with regulation of all telecommunica-
tions technologies, from radio to telephone to television.86 This Act gave 
the FCC broad discretionary power to regulate the use of telecommuni-
cations through adjudication and rulemaking.87 The Act is separated 
into seven titles, four of which concern general provisions and three of 
which correspond to the regulation of specific technology.88 This struc-
ture creates a “silo” model of regulation in which each technology falls 
under separate statutory provisions.89 Title II regulates common carri-
ers, such as telephony; Title III regulates services that transmit via the 
electromagnetic spectrum, such as radio and broadcast television; and 
Title VI regulates cable services, such as cable television.90 
 Before the creation of the FCC in 1934, the telephone market ex-
isted as a government-sanctioned monopoly.91 Bell Telephone Com-
pany (“Bell”), the dominant telephone company, argued for a govern-
ment-mandated monopoly as the best option for the industry, citing a 
number of reasons that the industry tended toward a natural monop-
                                                                                                                      
83 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 50–51; Boliek, supra note 33, at 1642–43. 
84 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (previously codified in scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (repealed 1996); Douglas B. McFadden, Essay, Antitrust and 
Communications: Changes After the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 Fed. Comm. L.J. 457, 458 
(1997). 
85 Stuart Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy 52–54 (2d ed. 
2006). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 60. 
88 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 54–55. 
89 Boliek, supra note 33, at 1642–43. 
90 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (previously codified in scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (repealed 1996) (delineating communications media types by 
title); Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 54–55. 
91 See id. at 702–03; Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should 
Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 383, 387–88 
(2010). 
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oly.92 First, the market approached a natural monopoly because the 
initial costs of investment in telephone networks were so high, and the 
marginal cost of adding each additional customer were so low, that in-
efficiencies would be created by having more than one provider.93 Sec-
ond, network effects existed in that the value of the service to each cus-
tomer increased exponentially as the network grew larger because each 
customer could communicate with a broader network of subscribers.94 
Bell’s argument prevailed and Congress passed the Willis-Graham Act, 
which exempted consolidations in the telephone industry from anti-
trust oversight and allowed Bell to create a monopoly.95 The govern-
ment granted Bell a monopoly in exchange for submitting to common 
carriage regulation.96 
 Since 1934, FCC governance has been marked by a slow move-
ment towards deregulation and free competition.97 The FCC inherited 
a system of monopoly and regulatory oversight, and it initially tolerated 
Bell’s dominance.98 As the Bell monopoly grew larger and expanded 
into long-distance and other derivative markets, however, the govern-
ment became concerned about the monopolistic state of the industry.99 
This concern ultimately led to a DOJ suit and the eventual breakup of 
the Bell monopoly in 1984.100 The 1984 Modification of Final Judg-
ment (“MFJ”) between the DOJ and Bell vested Bell’s long-distance ser-
vice in one company, AT&T, and opened the long-distance market to 
competition.101 The MFJ broke up Bell’s local telephone service into 
regional Bell operating companies that were subject to monopoly rate 
regulation and prohibited from expanding their service offerings be-
                                                                                                                      
92 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 695–98; id. at 1178 (“A natural monopoly is said 
to exist in any market where the costs of production are such that it is less expensive for 
demand to be met by one firm than it would be for that same demand to be met by more 
than one firm.”). 
93 Id. at 696; Lyons, supra note 91, at 387. 
94 Benjamin et al, supra note 85, at 698. Early telephone networks were not intercon-
nected, and thus a customer could only call other people who subscribed to his or her 
network. Id. 
95 Id. at 702. 
96 Id. 
97 See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
98 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 53–56; see Lyons, supra note 91, at 387–88. 
99 Benjamin et al, supra note 85, at 713. 
100 Id. at 723; see United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 
460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
101 AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 222–25; Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Telecom Antitrust Handbook 41–44 (2005) [hereinafter Telecom Antitrust Hand-
book]. 
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yond local telephone service.102 The divestiture of the Bell monopoly 
began to open telephony up to competition, but the 1996 Act com-
pleted this revolution.103 The 1996 Act, which amended the 1934 Act, 
aimed to inject competition into local telephone markets and enhance 
competition in other markets already open to competition.104 
                                                                                                                     
 Before the 1996 Act opened telecommunications up to antitrust 
law, the FCC had the exclusive right to review telecommunications 
mergers as part of its Title II authority to regulate common carriers.105 
Title II of the 1934 Act reflects the natural monopoly argument and 
regulates the rates, terms of entry, and service offerings of common 
carriers.106 Landline telephone service qualifies as a common carrier 
and is therefore regulated under this title.107 Section 221(a) of the 1934 
Act gave the FCC the authority to exempt mergers from antitrust scru-
tiny.108 Section 601(b) of the 1996 Act repealed Section 221(a) and 
clarified that the antitrust laws apply independently to telecommunica-
tions activity.109 The 1996 Act thus marks the beginning of dual jurisdic-
tion because from this point forward, both the DOJ and the FCC have 
had explicit statutory authority to review mergers.110 
 FCC regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum has also moved 
away from heavy-handed regulation, although not as drastically as with 
common carrier regulation.111 Title III of the 1934 Act concerns the 
regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum.112 This Title gives the FCC 
broad authority to allocate different uses for the spectrum among dif-
ferent frequency bands, issue licenses to private entities for use consis-
 
102 AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 222–25; Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 713–46; Tel-
ecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 42. 
103 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 771. 
104 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 772; see supra note 18 (discussing the interplay 
between the 1934 Act and the 1996 Act). 
105 See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. 
106 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006); Boliek, supra note 33, at 1643; Lyons, supra note 
91, at 387–88. 
107 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276; Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 55; Boliek, supra note 33, 
at 1643. 
108 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994), repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(b)(2). 
109 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006); Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1057. Despite the 
independent antitrust review, the FCC still reviews mergers under the 1934 Act. Benjamin 
et al., supra note 85, at 1057–58. 
110 See McFadden, supra note 84, at 459–60; supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text. 
111 See FCC, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, ET Docket No. 02-135 (2002) 
[hereinafter Spectrum Policy Report], reprinted in Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 84–
92. 
112 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 55. 
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tent with this plan, and regulate the renewal and transfer of such li-
censes.113 The potential for interference if spectrum usage were unregu-
lated, and the inherent scarcity of the spectrum due to its fixed nature, 
are common policy justifications for government regulation of the spec-
trum.114 Professor Ronald Coase argues that the government should 
take a more hands-off approach to spectrum regulation and allow the 
market to determine which frequencies should be used for which pur-
poses.115 Although this argument has not come to dominate the FCC’s 
approach to spectrum regulation, the FCC does advocate a more limited 
use of its “command-and-control” system of licensing specific frequen-
cies for specific defined uses.116 
 The advent of wireless telephony has disturbed the FCC’s organ-
ized system of regulation according to the underlying technology be-
cause it falls under both Title II and Title III of the 1934 Act.117 Wire-
less telephony involves the sale to the public of voice communication 
directly from one party to another and therefore wireless companies 
qualify as common carriers under Title II of the 1934 Act.118 But wire-
less telephony uses the electromagnetic spectrum, rather than physical 
wires, to transmit its signals.119 Thus, wireless providers also qualify as 
spectrum licensees under Title III of the 1934 Act.120 To limit the con-
fusion caused by this dual classification, the FCC exempted wireless 
providers from the majority of the common carriage duties of Title 
II.121 Most importantly, the FCC chose not to regulate the rates of the 
wireless companies because the market for wireless service did not ex-
hibit the same natural monopoly concerns as traditional wired service, 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. at 62–63. 
114 Id. at 31–34. 
115 See Ronald H. Coase, Why Not Use the Pricing System in the Broadcast Industry?, Free-
man: Ideas on Liberty, July 1961, at 52, 52–54, available at http://www.unz.org/Pub/ 
Freeman-1961jul-00052 (publishing a condensed version of Professor Ronald Coase’s De-
cember 11, 1959 testimony to the FCC). 
116 See Spectrum Policy Report, supra note 111, at 84–92. 
117 See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (noting that wireless providers are treated as common car-
riers); Requirements Under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 C.F.R. § 20.15 (2011) 
(exempting wireless providers from 47 U.S.C. § 203 rate regulation); Daniel Lyons, Regula-
tion of Wireless Telephony 1 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished handout) (on file with author). 
118 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(10), 332(c)(1)(a); Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 418 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
119 Daniel Sineway, Note, What’s Wrong with Wireless?: An Argument for a Liability Ap-
proach to Electromagnetic Spectrum Regulation, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 671, 673 (2007); Lyons, supra 
note 117, at 2. 
120 47 C.F.R. § 20.15(a); Lyons, supra note 117, at 2. 
121 Orloff, 352 F.3d at 418; 47 C.F.R. § 20.15. 
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and instead developed, from its creation, as a competitive market.122 
Although wireless companies do maintain some obligations under Title 
II, they are primarily treated as spectrum licensees under Title III.123 
 The FCC’s authority to review telecommunications mergers stems 
from Title II and Title III of the 1934 Act.124 Section 214(a) of Title II 
requires FCC approval for the acquisition or construction of any new 
line by a common carrier.125 Section 310(d) of Title III requires FCC 
approval for the transfer of any spectrum license.126 As a result, the 
FCC has the authority, and legal duty, to review all mergers in the tele-
communications industry that involve the acquisition of licenses.127 
Practically every major telecommunications merger requires the trans-
fer of licenses, and therefore, the FCC’s authority to review mergers 
extends quite far.128 
                                                                                                                     
 This authority gives the FCC power to review mergers in the land-
line and wireless telephone industries under a broad public interest 
standard.129 The FCC’s authority to review mergers in landline teleph-
ony is vested in its section 214(a) power to review common carrier ac-
quisitions of communications lines (e.g., landline telephone wires).130 
The FCC’s authority to review wireless providers, conversely, stems from 
its section 310(d) power to review the transfer of spectrum licenses.131 
FCC approval under either provision requires an affirmative determi-
nation that such transfer is in the public interest.132 Although the FCC 
technically has power to review mergers under the Clayton Act, it typi-
 
122 Orloff, 352 F.3d at 418–19; 47 C.F.R. § 20.15. 
123 See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15; Lyons, supra note 117, at 1–3. 
124 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 55, 1057; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (Title II); id. 
§§ 301–399 (Title III). 
125 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006). Section 214 requires that a company seeking to acquire 
new lines obtain “from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public con-
venience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construc-
tion and operation, of such additional or extended line.” Id. 
126 Id. § 310(d). A spectrum license is a license, granted by the FCC, for use of a desig-
nated portion of the electromagnetic spectrum for transmission of signals over the air. 
Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 5–8. Section 310(d) requires, as a prerequisite to license 
transfer, that the FCC find “that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be 
served thereby.” 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). 
127 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1058; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 148. 
128 See Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 148. 
129 See infra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
130 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006). 
131 Id. § 310(d). 
132 See id. §§ 214(a), 310(d); Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Footfalls: Telecommunica-
tions Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 1311, 1320–21 (2007). 
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cally declines to act under this authority, choosing instead to use its 
more flexible power to approve license transfers under the 1934 Act.133 
D. FCC Legal Standard and Procedure 
 The FCC’s merger review authority is broader in scope than the 
DOJ’s authority.134 In addition to performing a competition analysis 
comparable to that of the DOJ, FCC review takes into account public 
interest factors extrinsic to the competitive effect of the merger.135 Un-
like the DOJ, the FCC’s statutory authority is focused on the discrete 
issue of whether the transfer or acquisition of licenses, not the merger 
as a whole, is in the public interest.136 In practice, however, the FCC 
does not confine its review to the license transfer issue, but instead con-
siders whether the merger as a whole would serve the public interest.137 
 If a telecommunications merger requires the consent of the FCC 
to transfer licenses or acquire wire lines, the parties must file an appli-
cation with the FCC.138 This application typically includes documenta-
tion and information outlining the bounds of the transaction and the 
predicted public interest benefits.139 Any interested parties, including 
members of the general public, may then file comments and replies in 
response to the merger.140 The FCC may also request additional mate-
rials from the parties to facilitate the review.141 The entire application 
record is available to the public.142 The FCC has set a 180-day time limit 
                                                                                                                      
133 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 41. The FCC has jurisdiction to review mergers 
under sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act, but in practice rarely chooses to exercise this 
authority, relying instead on its authority under the 1934 Act. Id.; see supra note 46 (outlin-
ing the FCC’s Clayton Act authority to review mergers). 
134 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1056–59; Telecom Antitrust Handbook, 
supra note 101, at 70–75. 
135 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1058–59. 
136 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 70–72. 
137 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1058–59. 
138 Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 148. 
139 See Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 83; Russell & Wolson, supra 
note 9, at 148–49. 
140 Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 148. Upon application to the FCC, the FCC de-
lineates a time limit for the submission of comments and replies. See infra note 201 and 
accompanying text (discussing an example of the FCC scheduling process). 
141 Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 148. 
142 Id. 
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for completion of its review.143 This time limit, however, is self-imposed, 
not statutory, and the FCC rarely adheres to it.144 
 After reviewing all the comments, replies, and party documenta-
tion, the FCC conducts an analysis to determine whether the transfer 
would be in the public interest.145 The merging parties bear the burden 
of affirmatively demonstrating that the proposed transfer is in the pub-
lic interest.146 This standard sharply contrasts with the burden placed 
on the DOJ to demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of a merger 
when seeking to block it.147 After conducting its analysis, the FCC may 
act in one of three ways: it may approve the transfer, it may reject the 
transfer outright, or it may attach conditions to the transfer.148 In prac-
tice, the FCC rarely rejects a merger outright; typically, the FCC at-
taches conditions to its approval, and the merging parties either accept 
the conditions or abandon the transaction.149 Once the FCC has ap-
proved the transfer, its decision on the public interest question is enti-
tled to “substantial judicial deference.”150 
 The FCC’s public interest analysis includes an evaluation of the 
competitive effects of the proposed merger.151 Although the public in-
terest analysis historically considered the implications for competition, 
the 1996 Act explicitly enumerated this factor as part of the public in-
terest calculation.152 This part of the FCC’s analysis mirrors the anti-
trust analysis conducted by the DOJ.153 The FCC begins by defining the 
relevant product and geographic markets, evaluating the merger’s ef-
fect on competition in those markets, and considering mitigating fac-
tors to determine whether the merger’s procompetitive effects out-
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. at 149; Rinner, supra note 21, at 1574. 
144 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 30–31 (“The average merger takes two to four 
months to conclude [review at the FCC]. Telecommunications mergers, however, take be-
tween nine and twelve months to conclude.”); Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 149–150. 
145 Curran, supra note 61, at 757–58. 
146 Id. 
147 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38. 
148 See Rinner, supra note 21, at 1575. 
149 See Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 149. 
150 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 43; see SBC Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 
1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“So long as ‘the FCC’s action resulted from consideration of 
the relevant factors’ and the agency has not ‘succumbed to a clear error of judgment,’ its 
decision must be upheld.” (quoting GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.3d 263, 268 (D.C. Cir. 
1986)). 
151 Curran, supra note 61, at 758. 
152 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 71–72; see Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
47 U.S.C.). 
153 Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 199. 
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weigh its anticompetitive effects.154 The FCC’s competitive analysis dif-
fers in one respect from that of the DOJ: the FCC’s approach is more 
forward-looking and considers the effect on future competition, not 
just the effect on competition immediately following the merger.155 
                                                                                                                     
 The FCC’s broad power to review for the public interest allows the 
agency to move beyond pure antitrust analysis to consider other relevant 
factors.156 The FCC considers the general aims of the 1934 Act, such as 
promoting access to high quality and diverse telecommunications ser-
vices and ensuring the FCC’s ability to regulate.157 The ability to con-
sider these additional factors differentiates the FCC’s review from that of 
the DOJ and provides for a broader and more discretionary analysis.158 
II. The Preliminary Injunction Problem 
 Subjecting telecommunications mergers to review by two federal 
agencies under different standards that support different policy objec-
tives creates inefficiencies, encourages collusion between the agencies, 
and ultimately frustrates the objectives of antitrust law.159 Section A of 
this Part explains how ongoing FCC review allows the DOJ to move 
forward with cases without seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent 
the parties from completing the merger transaction.160 Section B then 
shows how the recent experience of AT&T and T-Mobile demonstrates 
this entrenched problem.161 Finally, Section C outlines the impact of 
this preliminary injunction problem on the dissemination of antitrust 
and telecommunications policy.162 
A. The Preliminary Injunction Requirement and Merger Delay 
 The preliminary injunction requirement, which compels the DOJ 
to seek a preliminary injunction before halting progress on a merger, 
typically prevents the DOJ from holding up mergers in the court system 
when it does not have a strong case.163 When bringing suit to block a 
merger, the DOJ is usually required to seek a preliminary injunction to 
 
154 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 44–45. 
155 See Rinner, supra note 21, at 1575. 
156 See Curran, supra note 61, at 759–60. 
157 See id. 
158 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 42–43, 45. 
159 See infra notes 163–253 and accompanying text. 
160 See infra notes 163–187 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 188–219 and accompanying text. 
162 See infra notes 220–253 and accompanying text. 
163 See infra notes 164–166 and accompanying text. 
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prevent the merger from being consummated while court proceedings 
are ongoing.164 The preliminary injunction requirement is vested in 
Section 15 of the Clayton Act, which gives the court power to “make 
such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed 
just in the premises.”165 Obtaining a preliminary injunction forces the 
DOJ to quickly and succinctly assemble its case and make an affirmative 
evidentiary showing of the anticompetitive effects of the merger.166 
 The preliminary injunction requirement and accompanying evi-
dentiary standard, under which the DOJ bears the burden of proof, 
comport with broader antitrust policy.167 The HSR Act makes possible 
the prophylactic rejection of anticompetitive mergers not permitted by 
the Clayton Act alone.168 Under the HSR Act, merging parties must 
submit to agency review before consummation of the merger.169 Re-
viewing mergers before consummation is more efficient and allows a 
more effective application of antitrust law than would the alternative of 
analyzing the effects of the mergers after completion.170 These effi-
ciencies can be realized only if the parties halt progress on the merger 
during review.171 A preliminary injunction provides a mechanism for 
the government to extend the pause initiated by the HSR review proc-
es 72 
 The preliminary injunction standard reflects the seriousness of 
antitrust intervention.
s.1
                                                                                                                     
173 Antitrust law envisions a default system in 
which competitors are allowed to compete and prosper without gov-
ernment intervention.174 According to antitrust policy, a perfect free-
market system is an efficient system because the price of each product 
naturally follows from the value that consumers place on that product; 
resources, therefore, are put to their highest and best use.175 Antitrust 
 
164 Elhauge, supra note 8, at 587. 
165 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); Motion of United States for Preliminary Injunction, supra 
note 10, at 1; Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358–59. 
166 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 371–72, 380–87. 
167 See infra notes 168–172 and accompanying text. 
168 Ling, supra note 28, at 940–41. 
169 15 U.S.C. § 18a; Bailey, supra note 29, at 440. 
170 Bailey, supra note 29, at 448–50; Ling, supra note 28, at 940–43. 
171 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 122; Rinner, supra note 21, at 
1572–73. 
172 See Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 122. 
173 See infra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. 
174 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 1; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 
2–8. 
175 Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 2–8; Thomas Sowell, Basic Economics: A Citi-
zen’s Guide to the Economy 11–37 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004). 
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law interrupts this balance only when absolutely necessary to prevent 
anticompetitive behavior.176 When challenging a merger, therefore, the 
DOJ bears the burden of demonstrating the anticompetitive effects be-
fore interruption of the free market will occur.177 Likewise, the DOJ 
bears the burden when seeking a preliminary injunction.178 The gov-
ernment is not permitted to suspend the merger process beyond the 
thirty- to sixty-day HSR review period without making an evidentiary 
showing beyond its initial complaint.179 This requirement prevents the 
abuse of power and ensures that the free market remains the status 
uo
                                                         
q .180 
 Mergers in the telecommunications industry, however, are not sub-
ject to the preliminary injunction requirement because concurrent re-
view by the FCC obviates this need.181 Because telecommunications 
mergers require approval by both the FCC and the DOJ, parties to a 
proposed merger cannot move forward with the transaction until the 
FCC determines that the requested license transfer comports with the 
public interest.182 Unlike DOJ review, however, FCC review is not subject 
to any enforceable time limit.183 When the DOJ files suit to block a tele-
communications merger, FCC review typically persists in the back-
ground.184 As long as this FCC review continues, the merging parties 
may not consummate their transaction irrespective of whether the DOJ 
seeks a preliminary injunction at court.185 The simultaneous FCC review 
essentially guarantees that once the DOJ files suit, the case will move 
toward trial and the parties’ transaction will be placed on hold without 
the DOJ making any sort of evidentiary showing beyond that contained 
                                                             
a note 9, at 1; Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 
2–8
. 
5 U.S.C. §§ 18–18a (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006); Memorandum in Support 
of P
 
k, supra note 101, at 83. 
 Order, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
176 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supr
; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38, 57. 
177 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38. 
178 Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358, 371–72. 
179 See id. at 25, 358, 371–72; supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text. 
180 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358, 371–72
181 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1057; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 30–31; see 
Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 58, 69–71. 
182 1
laintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 10, at 4; Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, 
at 197.
183 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 83; Rinner, supra note 21, at 
1574. 
184 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 
10, at 4–5; Telecom Antitrust Handboo
185 See 47 U.S.C. §§214(a), 310(d); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Scheduling
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in the initial complaint.186 In this way, it is easier for the DOJ to chal-
lenge mergers in the telecommunications industry because concurrent 
FCC review independently prevents the merging parties from consum-
mating the transaction, thereby relieving the DOJ of its typical prelimi-
nary injunction requirement; thus, antitrust law applies inconsistently.187 
B. The Prelimin : The Proposed  
en the largest of the three, claiming for-
ary Injunction Problem in Action
Merger of AT&T and T-Mobile 
 Government opposition to the proposed merger between AT&T 
and T-Mobile demonstrates how systemic inefficiencies of dual review 
overwhelm antitrust policy by delaying mergers without the safeguards 
provided by a preliminary injunction.188 In the case of AT&T and T-
Mobile, the DOJ pursued its case without obtaining the preliminary 
injunction normally necessary to prevent consummation of a 
merger.189 On March 20, 2011, AT&T and Deutsche Telekom AG 
(“DT”) announced the merger between AT&T and T-Mobile.190 The 
parties entered into a binding agreement whereby AT&T would ac-
quire T-Mobile from DT for cash and stock valued at thirty-nine billion 
dollars.191 The transaction, if consummated, would have left only three 
major wireless telephone companies in the United States.192 The com-
bined company would have be
ty-two percent of all U.S. wireless subscribers.193 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 
10, 
 States for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 
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1560 (Sept. 16, 2011); Com-
plai .C. Aug. 31, 2011). 
up fee, payable 
by A
print 
Nex p. (“Sprint”) to compete in the nationwide wireless telephone market. Id. 
at 4–5. 
187 See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text. Compare Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 10, at 1 (declining to seek a pre-
liminary injunction), with Motion of United
at 1 (seeking a preliminary injunction). 
188 See infra notes 189–219 and accompanying text. 
189 See Second Amended Complaint at 1–4, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11–01560 
(Sept. 30, 2011); Amended Complaint at 1–4, AT&T, No. 11–0
nt at 1–3, AT&T, No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D
190 AT&T News Release, supra note 1. 
191 Id. DT would receive twenty-five billion dollars in cash and fourteen billion dollars in 
AT&T stock for the sale; this would give DT approximately an eight percent stake in AT&T. 
Press Release, T-Mobile USA, Deutsche Telekom to Receive 39 Billion USD for T-Mobile USA 
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/articles/att-acquires-tmobile-USA. The 
agreement between AT&T and DT was subject to a three billion dollar break
T&T to DT, if the deal was not consummated. Sorkin et al., supra note 4. 
192 Sorkin et al., supra note 4. The merger would leave AT&T, Verizon, and S
tel Cor
193 Id. 
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 Immediately following the announcement of the merger, both 
AT&T and T-Mobile spoke positively of the deal.194 In its press release 
announcing the merger, AT&T praised the deal, saying it would deliver 
much needed additional spectrum capacity that would, in turn, in-
crease service quality for customers and ensure a rapid deployment of 
4G LTE access to ninety-five percent of the population.195 Similarly, T-
Mobile reassured customers that the merger would bring improved 
quality of voice and data service and access to 4G LTE technology.196 
The deal did not receive the same warm reception from the public.197 
T&T.200 The FCC began its process of 
reviewing the merger by establishing a pleading cycle with separate 
dea
                                
Almost immediately after the announcement, critics posited that the 
merger would significantly reduce competition in the wireless industry, 
leaving consumers with less choice, less innovation, and ultimately, 
higher prices.198 
 The FCC opened a docket on April 14, 2011 to prepare for filings 
regarding the proposed merger.199 Pursuant to their obligations under 
the 1934 Act, AT&T and DT filed applications with the FCC on April 
28, 2011 requesting consent to transfer control of all licenses and au-
thorizations held by T-Mobile to A
dlines for submission of petitions to deny, oppositions to those peti-
tions, and replies to those petitions.201 The FCC received numerous 
petitions to deny this merger.202 
                                                                                      
a_term/0,1237,t=LTE&i=58327,00.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). 
.com/articles/letter-to-our-customers. 
www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2011/04/01/att_t_mobile_ 
dea
 Opens Docket for Proposed Transfer of Control of T-Mobile USA, Inc. 
and Its Subsidiaries from Deutsche Telekom AG to AT&T Inc., 26 FCC Rcd. 5887, 5887 
(Ap
 
194 See infra notes 195–196 and accompanying text. 
195 AT&T News Release, supra note 1. 4G LTE (“Long Term Evolution”) is the latest and 
fastest wireless communication standard. See Definition of LTE, PCMag.com, http://www. 
pcmag.com/encyclopedi
196 Press Release, T-Mobile USA, Dear Valued T-Mobile Customers, (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://newsroom.t-mobile
197 See Sorkin et al., supra note 4; Jenna Wortham, Little to Cheer for Consumers in AT&T 
Deal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2011, at A1; AT&T, T-Mobile Deal Raises Questions, Boston.com, Apr. 
1, 2011, http://
l_raises_questions/. 
198 See Sorkin et al., supra note 4; Wortham, supra note 197; AT&T, T-Mobile Deal Raises 
Questions, supra note 197. 
199 Commission
r. 14, 2011). 
200 AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG Seek FCC Consent to the Transfer of Con-
trol of the Licenses and Authorizations Held by T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Its Subsidiaries to 
AT&T Inc., 26 FCC Rcd. 6424, 6424 (Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter AT&T/T-Mobile Ac-
cepted for Filing]. 
201 Id. at 6426. 
202 Petition to Deny of Free Press, at 6–7, In re AT&T Inc., WT Docket No. 11-65 (FCC 
May 31, 2011); Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition at 4, 
WT Docket No. 11-65 (FCC May 31, 2011); Petition to Deny, Sprint Nextel Corp. at 1, WT 
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 While the FCC review continued, the DOJ brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to permanently en-
join the merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act.203 The complaint 
defined the relevant product market as the market for mobile wireless 
telecommunications services, including both voice and data services.204 
Further, it defined the relevant geographic market as nationwide com-
petition across local markets.205 The complaint also stated that follow-
ing the merger, the wireless market would be highly concentrated ac-
cording to the HHI.206 It then outlined the importance of T-Mobile as a 
competitive force in the market, and the anticompetitive effects that 
would be generated on the product and geographic markets as a result 
of the proposed merger.207 The defendants’ answer, filed on September 
9, 2011, denied most of the allegations in the complaint and argued 
that the merger would be positive for consumers and would give AT&T 
the additional spectrum it needed to continue its high-quality ser-
vice.208 
 After the initial complaint and answer were filed, the DOJ case 
proceeded concurrently with the FCC review until AT&T ultimately 
                                                                                                                      
Docket No. 11-65 (FCC May 31, 2011). Sprint filed a petition to deny, arguing that the 
proposed merger would eliminate Sprint’s ability to compete in the wireless market and 
would effectively create a duopoly in the industry between the new AT&T and Verizon. 
Petition to Deny, Sprint Nextel Corp., supra, at i–iv, 36–37. Sprint argued that the merger 
would harm competition, which would lead to higher prices, less innovation, and lower 
t 1–7; Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge and Future 
of M
 supra note 189, at 1–3. 
pra note 189, at 5–8. 
g the market and the lack of any measurable efficiencies created by the merger. 
Id. a
at the merger was in the public interest 
and
quality service, and would not provide any benefit to the industry. Id. at i–iv. Two promi-
nent think tanks, Public Knowledge and Free Press, made similar arguments in separately 
filed petitions to deny. Petition to Deny of Free Press, supra, at 1–3; Petition to Deny of 
Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition, supra, at 1–4. The think tanks argued 
that the merger must fail the FCC’s public interest review because it would raise serious 
antitrust concerns, cause public harm, and would not confer any substantial benefit. Peti-
tion to Deny of Free Press, supra, a
usic Coalition, supra, at 1–12. 
203 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006); Complaint,
204 Complaint, su
205 Id. at 8–11. 
206 Id. at 11–12. 
207 Id. at 12–20. The DOJ also highlighted the difficulty a new competitor would face 
in enterin
t 20. 
208 Answer at 1–25, AT&T, No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011). AT&T argued that 
the merger would create engineering efficiencies that would increase the quality and 
quantity of service. Id. at 1. The wireless industry, AT&T opined, is in fact highly competi-
tive, with the average consumer having a choice between at least five companies. Id. at 2, 6. 
Additionally, T-Mobile was already in a state of decline and, therefore, the merger would 
not harm consumers at all. Id. at 3. The answer concluded by denying that the government 
was entitled to the relief requested and stating th
 should therefore be permitted. Id. at 24–25. 
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backed out of the merger.209 In September, seven states joined the DOJ 
action and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to reflect this 
change.210 Discovery proceeded on schedule and trial was set for Feb-
ruary 2012.211 Meanwhile, the FCC extended its review past the 180-day 
self-imposed limit in order to review new data regarding AT&T’s claim 
that the merger would create more jobs.212 On November 22, 2011 the 
FCC publicly announced it was considering referring the matter to an 
administrative hearing for review.213 A document entitled “Staff Analy-
sis and Findings” accompanied the draft administrative hearing order 
and outlined the FCC’s opposition to the transaction.214 On November 
23, AT&T and T-Mobile sought formal withdrawal of their applications 
from consideration by the FCC.215 The FCC granted this withdrawal on 
November 29 and simultaneously released its Staff Analysis and Find-
ings to the public.216 The parties initially continued to fight the DOJ 
lawsuit, but ultimately withdrew that application as well on December 
19.217 All parties stipulated to a dismissal on December 20, and AT&T 
had to pay T-Mobile a breakup fee of over four billion dollars.218 Ex-
                                                                                                                      
ed com-
plai
.ibtimes.com/articles/245310/ 
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ki & Brent Kendall, FCC Stops Clock on AT&T Merger, 
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http:
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er a er parties.” Id. 
209 See infra notes 210–219 and accompanying text. 
210 Amended Complaint, supra note 189, at 1–2. California, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington joined the DOJ’s suit. Id. The Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico later joined the suit, and the plaintiffs filed a second amend
nt to reflect this change. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 189, at 1–2. 
211 See Manikandan Raman, AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Review May Extend Past DOJ’s Trial Date: 
Analyst, Int’l Bus. Times (Nov. 8, 2011 7:54 AM), http://www
11108/t-mobile-merger-review-extend-past-doj.htm. 
212 See Amy Schatz & Greg Bensinger, FCC Presses AT&T About Jobs Claims, Wall St. J., 
Oct. 14, 2011, at B4; Anton Troianovs
l St. J., July 21, 2011, at B1. 
213 In re Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to Assign or 
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, 26 FCC 
1) [hereinaft
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 16,185. 
216 Id. at 16,186. 
217 Michael J. de la Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. Times Blogs, 
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile/. 
The parties intended to focus their energy on the DOJ lawsuit and then reapply to the FCC 
for license transfer clearance after obtaining the antitrust clearance in court. See AT&T to 
Take $4-bn Charge as $39-bn T-Mobile Merger Nears Collapse, domain-b.com (Nov. 25, 20
//www.domain-b.com/companies/companies_a/AT&T/20111125_t_mobile.html. 
218 Stipulation of Dismissal, AT&T, No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2011); Merced, su-
pra note 217. A breakup fee, a typical feature of merger agreements, is “a fee paid if a party 
voluntary backs out of a deal to sell or purchase a business or a business’s assets.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1609 (9th ed. 2009). Breakup fees serve to “protect the prospective
nd to deter the target corporation from entertaining bids from oth
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actly e-
ment, the parties ha rger.219 
 parties could not consummate the 
erg
parent company of DIRECTV, entered into an agreement on October 
28, 2001 whereby EchoStar would acquire Hughes for cash and stock 
                                             
 nine months after AT&T and T-Mobile announced their agre
d definitively abandoned the me
C. The Preliminary Injunction Problem Explained: How Delay Causes  
Failure and Thwarts Policy Goals 
 At no point during this progression did the DOJ bring a motion for 
a preliminary injunction.220 As the DOJ case moved toward trial, the 
FCC continued to review the merger under its public interest stan-
dard.221 The FCC review, standing alone, prevented AT&T and T-Mobile 
from moving forward with the transaction.222 The DOJ, therefore, had 
no practical reason to seek a preliminary injunction because as long as 
the FCC continued its review, the
m er.223 This represents an inconsistent application of antitrust law, 
which should require the DOJ to bear the burden of proof throughout 
all stages of a merger challenge.224 
 The proposed merger between two nationwide direct broadcast 
satellite (“DBS”) providers in 2001 generated an identical preliminary 
injunction problem.225 DBS providers transmit video signal to paying 
customers using the electromagnetic spectrum and often compete with 
local cable companies.226 As a broadcast service, DBS providers are regu-
lated as spectrum licensees under Title III of the 1934 Act.227 EchoStar 
Communications Corporation (“EchoStar”), the parent company of 
Dish Network, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (“Hughes”), the 
                                                                         
ons, supra note 213, at 16,184; Edward Wyatt, U.S. Judge Grants Delay in 
Cha
U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006); Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 197; Sorkin 
et a
pra note 
5, a ether the AT&T/T-Mobile merger 
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pra note 5, at 38; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 151. 
 text. 
219 See AT&T News Release, supra note 1; Merced, supra note 217. 
220 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 189, at 1–4; Amended Complaint, su-
pra note 189, at 1–4; Complaint, supra note 189, at 1–3. 
221 See AT&T/T-Mobile Accepted for Filing, supra note 200, at 6424; Bureau Order 
Dismissing Applicati
llenge to AT&T Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2011, at B4; Merced, supra note 217. 
222 See 47 
l., supra note 4. 
223 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d); Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 197; Sorkin et al., 
supra note 4. 
224 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 358; Barkow & Huber, su
t 38; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 151. Wh
ld have been desirable is immaterial. See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 
358; Barkow & Huber, su
225 See infra notes 226–236 and accompanying
226 Complaint at 5–6, 9, United States v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., No. 1:0CV02138 
(D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2002). 
227 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 55. 
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then valued at twenty-six billion dollars.228 Pursuant to their obligation 
under the 1934 Act, in December of 2001 the parties filed a consoli-
dated application with the FCC to transfer control of numerous licenses 
from Hughes to EchoStar.229 The FCC review revealed serious anticom-
petitive concerns, and on October 9, 2002, the FCC designated the 
merger for a hearing.230 Meanwhile, the DOJ had been reviewing the 
merger according to the HSR Act, and it decided to file suit to block the 
merger on October 31, 2002.231 The DOJ explicitly noted that it was not 
seeking a preliminary injunction because the ongoing FCC review 
served the same function.232 The case therefore moved slowly toward 
trial set for June 2003.233 Much like AT&T and T-Mobile’s experience, 
EchoStar and DIRECTV could not move forward with their transaction 
even though the DOJ never made a showing of its likelihood of success 
on the merits.234 Eventually, on December 10, 2002, the parties agreed 
to abandon the merger and requested withdrawal.235 The FCC formally 
                                                                                                                      
228 Complaint, supra note 226, at 7–8. The agreement provided that Hughes would 
earing Designation Order in the Application of EchoStar Commc’ns 
Cor
48 (FCC 
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; Press Release, 
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’y, FCC 
(De
equesting the dismissal of Hughes and EchoStar’s application). 
split off from its parent company, General Motors Corporation, and would then merge 
with EchoStar. H
p., 17 FCC Rcd. 20,559, 20,561–62 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter EchoStar Hearing Des-
ignation Order]. 
229 Consolidated Application for Authority to Transfer Control at 1–2, No. 01-3
. 3, 2001), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/echostar-directv/echostar 
appli.pdf; see EchoStar Hearing Designation Order, supra note 228, at 20,561 & n.1. 
230 EchoStar Hearing Designation Order, supra note 228, at 20,563–65
, FCC Declines to Approve EchoStar-DIRECTV Merger (Oct. 10, 2002), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-227263A1.pdf. 
231 Complaint, supra note 226, at 5–6. In its complaint, the DOJ defined the relevant 
market as “numerous local geographic markets for MVPD [multichannel video program-
ming distribution] service, each consisting of a community whose members face the same 
competitive choices.” Id. at 15. The complaint expressed concern that the proposed mer-
ger wou
itionally, the complaint cited a high barrier to entry for a new MVPD provider. Id. at 
22–23. 
232 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 
10, at 1, 4–5 (“No preliminary injunction is being sought. . . . This tr
pleted by the Defendants’ self-imposed deadline—regardless of what this Court does—
because they
233 Scheduling Order para. 14, EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., No. 1:02CV02138 (D.D.C. Oct. 
31, 2002). 
234 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Scheduling Order, supra note 
10, at 1, 4–5. 
235 Letter from Counsel for Hughes and EchoStar, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec
c. 10, 2002), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6513398631 
(withdrawing and r
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granted this withdrawal on January 8, 2003, officially terminating the 
proceedings.236 
 As these examples show, the dual review system significantly im-
pacts the operation of antitrust law in the telecommunications indus-
try.237 In the four-plus months and the one and a half months, respec-
tively, that the AT&T/T-Mobile and EchoStar/DIRECTV cases were 
active in U.S. district court, the DOJ did not need to make an eviden-
tiary showing, beyond that in the complaint, that the proposed merger 
would decrease competition in the relevant market.238 Despite this lack 
of evidence, the parties could not move forward with consummation of 
their desired merger.239 This result runs counter to the DOJ’s burden 
to prove the likely anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger and the 
ver
                                                  
o all cautious stance of antitrust policy.240 The preliminary injunction 
problem shows that telecommunications mergers are treated differ-
ently and subject to easier challenge by the government than mergers 
in other industries.241 
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beneficial way for consumers. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text. The anti-
trust laws, therefore, insert government intervention into this system only when specific 
and serious anticompetitive behavior occurs. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The 
preliminary injunction requirement echoes this cautious stance, because it obligates the 
DOJ to put forward affirmative evidence demonstrating that specific and serious anticom-
petitive behavior has occurred before the government will insert itself into the free market 
system by forcing the merging parties to delay consummation. See supra notes 178–180 and 
accompanying text. Because dual review eliminates the DOJ’s preliminary injunction re-
quirement when it operates in the telecommunicat
 less concern for the protection of the free market. See Mergers and Acquisitions, 
supra note 9, at 358; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 38; Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, 
at 151; supra notes 181–187 and accompanying text. 
241 See Russell & Wolson, supra note 9, at 151; Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 206; Rin-
ner, supra note 21, at 1576–77. It is possible that 
nction makes it too difficult for the DOJ to challeng
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 Furthermore, in the case of AT&T and T-Mobile, this delay gave 
the DOJ valuable time to prepare its case and capitalize on increasing 
political opposition to the merger.242 Ultimately, the paused progress 
on consummation fed into growing public opposition to the merger, 
thereby contributing to the merger’s failure.243 For example, while the 
AT&T/T-Mobile suit was ongoing, heavy governmental and private op-
position to the merger developed.244 On the public side, one senator 
voiced vehement disapproval, citing likely reduced competition and 
lower quality for consumers.245 Private citizens also showed concern, 
reflected in newspaper articles, public FCC comments, and the many 
petitions to deny received by the court.246 
 The stalled state of the merger also allowed the DOJ and the FCC 
time to coordinate their opposition.247 The FCC seemed to support the 
DOJ’s case against the AT&T/T-Mobile merger by releasing the official 
analysis and findings of the FCC wireless bureau, which outlined the 
FCC’s sharp opposition.248 The release of this document prompted the 
parties to withdraw their application from the FCC and state that they 
wished to focus on the DOJ case.249 In reality, however, the release of 
this document was the beginning of the end for AT&T and T-Mobile.250 
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247 See infra notes 248–253 and accompanying text. 
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& Spencer E. Ante, U.S. Sues to Stop AT&T Deal: Justice Department Sa
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47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006). If AT&T and T-Mobile had prevailed against the DOJ 
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See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, 18; 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d). Because both DOJ and FCC approval 
is required before a telecommunications transaction can go forward, however, most merg-
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saction. See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 30–31
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After the parties withdrew from the FCC, the D.C. District Court grant-
ed delay for the parties to reevaluate whether they wished to proceed 
with the transaction, and ultimately it dismissed the case when AT&T 
withdrew its bid entirely.251 The FCC and the DOJ typically coordinate 
their review of telecommunications mergers in this way; the FCC usu-
ally waits until the DOJ has finished its review before issuing its own de-
cisi or-
dination with the FC  of the merger ulti-
ate
e role for each agency.258 This Part explores two options 
nd
ited FCC role, would solve the preliminary injunction problem and 
                                        
on.252 By providing time to build opposition and allowing for co
C, the delay in consummation
m ly allowed the DOJ to prevail in its action to block the merger 
without making an evidentiary showing to support its claims.253 
III. The Solution: Reform Within the Dual Review System, 
Curtailing the FCC’s Role 
 The DOJ’s failure to seek a preliminary injunction during its chal-
lenge to the proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger illustrates broader 
structural problems in the dual agency review system.254 The dual re-
view system leads to the inconsistent application of antitrust law by 
eliminating the DOJ’s need to seek a preliminary injunction.255 There 
are two types of reforms that would solve the preliminary injunction 
problem by ensuring that the DOJ retains its burden to seek a prelimi-
nary injunction in all industries under its purview.256 First, the dual re-
view structure could be completely eliminated by giving one agency 
exclusive jurisdiction to review telecommunications mergers.257 Sec-
ond, reforms could operate within the existing dual review structure, 
altering the working relationship between the DOJ and the FCC while 
preserving som
u er each approach and concludes that curbing the FCC’s procedural 
and substantive authority to review mergers, while maintaining a lim-
                                                                              
e supra notes 248–252 and accompanying text. 
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, alter-
nate antly curtail the substance and timeline of the FCC’s review, thereby 
mai  for the FCC. See infra notes 344–374 and accompanying text. 
251 Wyatt, supra note 221; Merced, supra note 217. 
252 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 83. 
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254 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at
 38. 
255 See supra notes 220–253 and accompanying text. 
256 See Curran, supra note 61, at 769–70. Professor David Curran recognizes both types 
of reforms, but he argues that the FCC should be granted the exclusive authority to review 
mergers in the telecommunications industry. See id. at 749–50. This Note’s proposal
ly, would signific
ntaining some role
257 See id. at 770. 
258 See id. at 769. 
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would best promote the current goals of antitrust and telecommunica-
tions policy.259 
 Section A discusses two reforms that would eliminate dual review 
entirely.260 First, the FCC could receive exclusive jurisdiction to review 
telecommunications mergers under its public interest standard.261 Sec-
ond, the role of the FCC could be eliminated, leaving only the DOJ to 
review mergers in the telecommunications industry.262 Section B dis-
cusses two more moderate reforms that would address the preliminary 
injunction problem while maintaining the overall structure of dual re-
view.263 First, a clearance process could be implemented whereby spe-
cific mergers are assigned to review by either the DOJ or the FCC de-
pending on peculiarities and the industry involved.264 Alternatively, a 
strict timeline for FCC review could be adopted and the substance of 
FCC review wedded to its statutory authority.265 This final option, re-
ducin best 
vindicate antitrust and te licy and would solve the 
rob
 FCC’s 
power to review mergers altogether.267 Although both options would 
/T-
Mo letely eliminating the role of one agency would cre-
e i
                                                                                                                     
g the procedural and substantive authority of the FCC, would 
lecommunications po
p lems demonstrated by the AT&T/T-Mobile merger.266 
A. Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen? Possible Reform by Eliminating  
Dual Review Altogether 
 Two obvious options for reform emerge as solutions to the pre-
liminary injunction problem: Congress could remove the DOJ’s power 
to review telecommunications mergers, or it could eliminate the
solve the preliminary injunction problem presented by the AT&T
bile case, comp
at nconsistencies in antitrust or telecommunications policy.268 
 
ossibilities). 
J and FCC review are 
bot  text. 
259 See infra notes 267–374 and accompanying text. 
260 See infra notes 267–321 and accompanying text. 
261 See infra notes 269–306 and accompanying text. 
262 See infra notes 307–321 and accompanying text. 
263 See infra notes 322–374 and accompanying text. 
264 See infra notes 324–343 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 344–374 and accompanying text. 
266 See infra notes 344–373 and accompanying text. 
267 See Curran, supra note 61, at 770, 779 (raising the two p
268 See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 206–08 (arguing that DO
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1. The First Option: Kick the DOJ Out of the Telecommunications 
Merger World 
 First, Congress could assign exclusive jurisdiction to the FCC to 
review mergers in the telecommunications industry and eliminate the 
role of the DOJ.269 This option would solve the preliminary injunction 
problem confronted by AT&T and T-Mobile.270 Without the involve-
ment of the DOJ, the AT&T/T-Mobile merger would have required 
only FCC review under its public interest standard.271 Unless the FCC 
began acting on its Clayton Act authority (as opposed to its 1934 Act 
authority), the parties would not have been subject to antitrust review 
ndeu r the Clayton Act and would never have encountered the court 
system in the first place.272 Although the FCC’s limitless review would 
still subject some merging parties to considerable delay, this delay 
would be primarily a reflection of telecommunications policy and the 
FCC’s unenforceable self-imposed time limit; telecommunications 
would be removed from the purview of antitrust law, which would then 
apply consistently across all other industries.273 
 There are several arguments that support exclusive FCC telecom-
munications merger review.274 First, the FCC is an expert agency that 
has superior technological expertise to the DOJ.275 Given the unique 
contours and constantly evolving nature of telecommunications, it may 
be especially important to subject mergers to review by an agency sensi-
tive to these peculiarities.276 Second, the FCC’s public interest standard 
considers a broader range of sources in its analysis than the DOJ’s 
competitive effects approach does.277 For example, the public interest 
standard takes a forward-looking stance to competition, accounting for 
                                                                                                                      
269 See Curran, supra note 61, at 770 (advocating this position). 
270 See infra notes 271–272 and accompanying text. 
supra notes 134–158 and accompa-
nyin
ed to consider closely the likelihood and desirability of the FCC beginning to 
revi  Act authority. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2006). 
ays an important role in merger 
revi
enjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1056–59. 
271 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 30–31, 40; 
g text. 
272 See id. at 35–40. Before passing legislation to implement this solution, Congress 
would ne
ew mergers under its concurrent Clayton
273 See Curran, supra note 61, at 759–60. 
274 See infra notes 275–281 and accompanying text. 
275 Curran, supra note 61, at 770; see also Harold Feld, The Need for FCC Merger Review, 
Comm. Law., Fall 2000, at 20, 21 (arguing that the FCC pl
ew). 
276 See Curran, supra note 61, at 773–74. 
277 B
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the development of the industry over time.278 Additionally, the public 
interest standard weighs not only the competitiveness of the industry, 
but also the quality and diversity of offerings in the industry.279 Some 
t would undermine Congress’s decision to subject telecom-
scholars argue that this type of broad review best serves the interest of 
the public at large.280 Finally, there are other industries in which mer-
ger review by sector-specific agencies, to the exclusion of the general 
antitrust laws, continues to function well.281 
 Upon closer examination, however, the futility of these arguments 
becomes clear.282 Consider, for example, two hypothetical telecommu-
nications mergers: under the Clayton Act antitrust analysis, one merger 
is deemed anticompetitive and the other is deemed competitively neu-
tral or procompetitive.283 Antitrust policy dictates that the anticompeti-
tive merger should be blocked no matter what the FCC thinks and no 
matter what plausible public interest benefits can be raised.284 Denying 
this poin
munications mergers to antitrust review.285 The FCC’s expertise may be 
valuable in evaluating the merger under the antitrust framework, but 
this does not justify full-fledged FCC review under a different stan-
dard.286 
                                                                                                                      
278 See Curran, supra note 61, at 772–73; Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, 
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son L. Rev. 135, 137–38 (2002). For example, the 
lusive jurisdiction over railroad mergers and the U.S. Department of Transportation 
retains exclusive jurisdiction over international airline alliance agreements. Id. 
282 See infra notes 283–306 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (explaining that the DOJ’s Clayton 
Act analysis balances the anticompetitive effects of the merger, judged by its impact on 
market power, against any procompetitive and mitigating factors). 
284 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006); 47 
U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994), repealed by Telecommunications A
al., supra note 85, at 1057. For example, AT&T’s argument that the merger with T-
Mobile would create many jobs should not take away from the anticompetitive nature of 
the transaction. See Schatz & Bensinger, supra note 
285 See 47 U.S.C. § 152 note; 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994), repealed by Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 § 601(b)(2); supra note 18 (discussing Congress’s decision to re
trust review of telecommunications mergers). 
286 See Telecommunications Merger Review Act, S. 
that the FCC may submit comments to the DOJ o
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 Turning to the hypothetical competitively neutral or procompeti-
tive merger, FCC analysis would have an impact only where it recog-
nized public interest harm that would outweigh the neutral or positive 
competitive effect.287 Allowing public interest factors to negate a com-
petitively neutral or precompetitive transaction is not desirable for two 
aso
conflicts with the common conception of antitrust law for the 
CC
nications industry has unique characteristics that justify exclusion from 
the antitrust laws.297 In the early days of the FCC, concerns with natural 
                                                        
re ns.288 First, the FCC’s public interest review is speculative.289 For 
example, the FCC often attempts to predict the competitive environ-
ment likely to result years after the proposed transaction is finalized.290 
Second, the FCC is unbounded in what factors it may consider as part 
of public interest promotion.291 For example, the FCC has considered 
the impact of transactions on the FCC’s own ability to regulate the in-
dustry effectively.292 
 It 
F  to block competitively neutral or procompetitive mergers due to 
these speculative and unbounded public interest concerns.293 If Con-
gress intends for concerns like service quality, job promotion, diversity 
of sources, and regulatory ease to be weighed against the transaction’s 
impact on competition, it should provide for consideration of these 
factors in all mergers, not just those in the telecommunications indus-
try.294 
 Granting the FCC exclusive jurisdiction would thus conflict directly 
with antitrust and telecommunications law and policy.295 It is true that 
some other industries operate successfully in a sector-specific merger 
regulation regime.296 Transitioning to a sector-specific review of tele-
communications mergers, however, would suggest that the telecommu-
                                                              
ote 18. 
otes 289–292 and accompanying text. 
 Huber, supra note 5, at 55–56. 
s, but it has ultimately rejected these arguments due to the 
sam cy. Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and 
Con on in Merging and Emerging Media, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 1009, 1018–20 (1996). 
287 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d); supra n
288 See infra n
289 See Barkow &
290 But see Curran, supra note 61, at 772–73 (arguing that this predictive review is not 
speculative but rather grounded in real data). 
291 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 42. 
292 Id. at 54. 
293 See id. at 57. 
294 See id. at 81–83. In fact, at one point, antitrust law tried to embrace these types of 
public interest consideration
e concerns about unpredictability and inconsisten
tent Regulati
295 See infra notes 296–306 and accompanying text. 
296 See Rill, supra note 281, at 137–38; supra note 281 (offering examples of sector-
specific merger regulation). 
297 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 695–98. 
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monopoly provided such a rationale.298 The FCC, accordingly, had the 
authority to exempt mergers from antitrust scrutiny.299 The breakup of 
the Bell monopoly and the passage of the 1996 Act, however, revolution-
ized the status of telecommunications.300 The 1996 Act aimed to en-
courage transition from regulation and monopoly to deregulation and 
competition in telecommunications.301 As a result, the Act removed the 
FCC’s ability to exempt mergers from antitrust oversight and explicitly 
authorized antitrust review of telecommunications mergers.302 With this 
legislative change, telecommunications has entered the competitive 
world, and therefore interruption is warranted only in cases of anticom-
petitive conduct.303 Congress no longer views telecommunications as 
inherently monopoly-prone or otherwise deserving of special treat-
ment.304 It follows that broad public interest consideration is no longer 
et will 
mo ently take care of consumers.305 Telecommunications merg-
s t
e DOJ would therefore be unable to challenge a merger 
                                       
appropriate, because Congress believes that the competitive mark
re effici
er hus should be treated like mergers in most other industries and be 
subject to review by the DOJ under the antitrust laws.306 
2. The Other End of the Spectrum: Kick the FCC Out of Merger 
Review 
 At the other extreme, removing the FCC’s authority to review 
mergers would also solve the preliminary injunction problem posed by 
the AT&T/T-Mobile example.307 Without concurrent FCC review to 
prevent the consummation of the merger, the DOJ would be forced to 
seek a preliminary injunction in order to move forward with any mer-
ger case.308 Th
                                                                               
repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(b)(2); 
Ben  18 (discussing Congress’s decision to 
allo
ote 101, at 353. 
r, supra note 5, at 37; McFadden, supra 
not
2. 
10 and accompanying text. 
298 See id. 
299 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994), 
jamin et al., supra note 85, at 1057; supra note
cate antitrust review to the DOJ). 
300 See Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 723–46, 1056–59. 
301 Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra n
302 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006); Barkow & Hube
e 84, at 460; see supra note 18. 
303 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
304 See id. at 57; McFadden, supra note 84, at 461. But see Feld, supra note 275, at 2
305 See Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 8–12; Sowell, supra note 175, at 11–37; Telecom 
Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 353. 
306 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 35–37. 
307 See infra notes 308–3
308 See 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006); Frankel, supra note 
70, at 169 n.37; Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 197; Sorkin et al., supra note 4. 
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w out making a preliminary showing of anticompetitive effects.ith
promotion of the public interest.318 Finally, eliminating FCC authority 
                                                                                                                     
309 In 
the case of AT&T and T-Mobile, this would have resulted in a review 
more consistent with the import of antitrust law by reinstating the 
DOJ’s obligation to take action to prevent pre-trial consummation of 
the merger.310 
 The complete elimination of the FCC’s role in reviewing mergers, 
however, would create its own problems and inconsistencies.311 First, the 
FCC’s technical expertise is valuable in determining the competitive 
effect of any given merger.312 For example, AT&T argued that it needed 
access to the additional spectrum space that the T-Mobile merger would 
provide so that it could increase service quality and effectively com-
pete.313 After parties put forth a claim of the anticompetitive impact of 
the proposed merger, courts consider whether the merger would gener-
ate efficiencies that outweigh the anticompetitive concerns.314 The FCC 
may be in a better position to evaluate the strength of these efficiency 
claims than the DOJ.315 Second, eliminating the FCC’s authority would 
create inconsistencies in the application of telecommunications pol-
icy.316 Elimination of the FCC’s role in merger review would mean that 
the FCC would no longer have authority to review license transfer trans-
actions related to mergers, but it would retain its authority to review li-
cense transfers outside of the merger context.317 The statutory lan-
guage, however, instructs the FCC to review all license transfers for 
 
309 See supra notes 70–78, 189–223 and accompanying text (explaining that the DOJ is 
 of the 
AT&
J’s failure to seek a preliminary injunction in the AT&T/T-Mobile case); 
supr reliminary injunction problem in telecommunica-
tion  law and its typical caution). 
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 275, at 22. 
typically required to seek a preliminary injunction in its merger challenges, and outlining 
how the DOJ did not need to seek a preliminary injunction during its challenge
T/T-Mobile merger). 
310 See supra notes 237–253 and accompanying text (describing the problems impli-
cated by the DO
a note 240 (explaining how the p
s merger review results in a perversion of antitrust
311 See infra notes 312–321 and accompanying text. 
312 See Curran, supra note 61, at 778; Feld, supra note 275, at 23; Weiss & Stern, supr
 6, at 206. 
313 Answer, supra note 208, at 
314 Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 29–31. 
315 See Answer, supra note 208, at 1; Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, at 29–31; Cur-
ran, supra note 61, at 778; Feld, supra note 275, at 23; Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 206. 
316 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006). 
317 See id. §§ 214(a), 310
318 See id. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (authorizing the FCC to review license transfers in all con-
texts); Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth Concurring in Part, 
Dissenting in Part, 14 FCC Rcd. 14,712, 15,174–89 (Oct. 6, 1999) [
ement of Commissioner], reprinted in Benjamin et al., supra note 85 at, 1075. But see 
Feld, supra note
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could create unintended inefficiencies.319 For example, merging parties 
could obtain clearance from the DOJ and consummate their transac-
tion, only to find out after the fact that the merger violated existing FCC 
regulati  early 
on.320 These problems caut plete elimination of FCC 
uth
solve the discrete preliminary injunction problem while 
maintaining the overall structure of the system.322 These solutions ad-
ts of 
ons, a result that could be avoided by some FCC review
ion against the com
a ority to review license transfers in the merger context.321 
B. Moderation Is the Best Policy: Measured Reform Within the  
Dual Review System 
 The problems associated with complete elimination of the role of 
either the DOJ or the FCC points toward a more moderate approach 
that would 
vocate relatively minor changes that would preserve the benefi
dual review and could be accomplished without revolutionary policy 
change.323 
1. Trying for Teamwork: Can the DOJ and the FCC Work It Out? 
 The first moderate approach would implement a clearance system 
whereby the FCC and DOJ would work together to decide which agen-
cy should review each specific proposed merger.324 The DOJ and the 
FTC utilize this type of clearance system to distribute mergers for re-
view under their concurrent Clayton Act authority.325 In 1948, the DOJ 
and the FTC signed an interagency agreement that outlined a process 
for assigning merger applications to one agency for review.326 First, 
both agencies conduct an initial review of the proposed merger.327 If 
either the DOJ or the FTC wishes to pursue an investigation, it will seek 
clearance from the other agency.328 If both agencies wish to investigate, 
                                                                                                                      
319 See Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 70–71; Bryan N. Tramont, 
Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through Unenforceable and 
Unwieldy “Voluntary” Agreements, 53 Fed. Comm. L.J. 49, 55–57 (2000). 
pra note 
319
209–10; Rinner, supra note 21, at 1580. 
ote 21, at 1580. 
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ons, supra note 9, at 13–16. 
944. 
320 See Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 70–71; Tramont, supra note 
319, at 55–57. 
321 See Telecom Antitrust Handbook, supra note 101, at 70–71; Tramont, su
, at 55–57. 
322 See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 
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326 Id. 
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the merger will be assigned to the agency with the most experience and 
expertise in the industry.329 A similar model could be implemented to 
distribute telecommunications merger review between the DOJ and the 
FCC.330 This model would require the two agencies to come to an in-
dependent agreement and to outline standards for assigning mergers 
to ch agency. ea
factors.340 Competitively neutral mergers thus would be approved if 
                                                                                                                     
331 For example, the agencies could divide up mergers 
based on the underlying technology involved or the overall competi-
tiveness of the specific industry.332 This type of clearance system would 
solve the preliminary injunction problem because only one agency, the 
DOJ or the FCC, would ultimately investigate each proposed merger.333 
 Two significant problems, however, would render the implementa-
tion of this solution undesirable.334 First, it would be difficult to decide 
on a methodology for allocating mergers between the two agencies be-
cause the FCC has considerably more expertise in telecommunications 
issues than the DOJ does.335 The DOJ, alternately, has a wider range of 
experience analyzing all issues of competition and antitrust.336 For this 
reason, it is unlikely that either the FCC or the DOJ would voluntarily 
agree to cede its merger review authority on a case-by-case basis.337 
Even if an agreement could be reached and discernible standards set 
for assigning the mergers for review, the FCC and the DOJ would re-
view their set of assigned mergers under very different standards.338 
The merging parties assigned to the FCC would have the burden of 
demonstrating that the transaction is in the public interest.339 The DOJ, 
alternately, would bear the burden to establish the anticompetitive ef-
fects of its assigned cases and would not consider other public interest 
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695–703, 1057 (noting that the 
FCC  mergers from antitrust review because 
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g text. 
te 61, at 769 (making this argument). 
The FTC and the DOJ, by contrast, both analyze 
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and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 13. 
340 See id. 
329 Id. at 94
330 See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 209–10. 
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332 See id.; see also Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 
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industry was considered prone to natural monopoly
333 See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 209–10. 
334 See infra notes 335–343 and accompanyin
335 Curran, supra no
336 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 50. 
337 See id. at 35–48. 
338 Jonathan B. Baker, Remarks, Sector-Specific Competition Enforcement at the FCC, 66 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 413, 415 (2011). 
gers under the same Clayton Act sta
339 See Baker, supra note 338, at 415. 
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assigned to the DOJ for review but could be challenged by the FCC.341 
The result would be a system in which telecommunications mergers 
would be subject to different standards and different results depending 
m-
sel ld create arbitrary results and is therefore an unten-
ble
with that of the DOJ.349 Under this solution, the FCC would have an ini-
                      
on how the DOJ and the FCC divide proposed mergers among the
ves.342 This wou
a  approach to solving this problem.343 
2. A Happy Medium: Docking the Scope and Timeline of the FCC’s 
Merger Review 
 A second moderate approach would be to rein in the FCC’s author-
ity by holding its review to a strict time limit and reducing the scope of 
its review to better reflect its statutory grant.344 To ensure that FCC re-
view operates concurrently without impacting the DOJ’s case, the FCC 
would have to complete its review before the DOJ brings suit.345 This 
would be accomplished by subjecting the FCC to a strict time limit and 
mandating that FCC and DOJ review of each transaction begin simulta-
neously.346 To address the time limit, one scholar has proposed that the 
DOJ’s stringent HSR timeline apply to the FCC’s review of mergers un-
der its 1934 Act authority.347 In order to accomplish this solution, the 
FCC would need to issue a final decision on the transaction within sixty 
days by rendering moot any conditions imposed or hearings scheduled 
after the expiration of this period.348 Finally, mandating that the merg-
ing parties file with the FCC at the same time they file with the FTC and 
DOJ would guarantee that the FCC’s sixty-day review period coincides 
                                                                                                
r, supra note 5, at 49. 
 text. 
nying text (noting the delay that arises when 
FCC ntinues after the DOJ brings suit). 
1. If the HSR timeline were applied to FCC review, any administrative 
hea
 18a (2006) (outlining 
DO
ic interest review without any link to concurrent DOJ review). 
341 Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 49. 
342 See Baker, supra note 338, at 415; Barkow & Hube
343 See Baker, supra note 338, at 415; Barkow & Huber, supra note 5, at 49. 
344 See infra notes 350–351 and accompanying
345 See supra notes 181–187 and accompa
 review co
346 See Rinner, supra note 21, at 1578–80. 
347 See id. 
348 See id. at 1580–81. The FCC has the ability to request an administrative hearing to 
determine “substantial and material question[s] of fact” to aid in its review. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 309(e) (2006). In fact, the FCC signaled its desire to initiate such a hearing during the 
final days of its review of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger. See Amy Schatz, AT&T Faces New 
Hurdle–Its $39 Billion T-Mobile Buy Is in Deeper Jeopardy as FCC Slaps on Extra Review, Wall St. 
J., Nov. 23, 2011, at B
ring would have to be completed during the sixty-day time frame. See Rinner, supra 
note 21, at 1580–81. 
349 See Rinner, supra note 21, at 1580–81. Compare 15 U.S.C. §
J statutory time limits for review), with 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (establishing FCC 
publ
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tial thirty-day period to review a proposed merger, would be able to seek 
supplemental information from the parties during this initial thirty days, 
and would then have an additional thirty days to come to a decision.350 
This solution would mitigate the preliminary injunction problem illu-
ina
                                                                                                                     
m ted by the failed AT&T/T-Mobile merger because a final FCC deci-
sion would be issued before the DOJ issued any complaint to enjoin the 
merger.351 
 Critics of this approach counter that the FCC would not be able to 
conduct a thorough public interest review in such a short amount of 
time.352 Curtailing the substance of the FCC’s authority, however, would 
allow it to complete its review within the sixty-day time limit.353 The 
FCC’s review should be limited to whether the license transfer, not the 
merger as a whole, would be in the public interest.354 The language of 
the 1934 Act supports this proposal.355 The FCC’s authority to review 
license transfers that accompany mergers is the same authority that al-
lows the FCC to review all license transfers.356 The content of FCC mer-
ger review, therefore, should mirror the review conducted for license 
transfers outside the merger context.357 When a license transfer does 
not accompany a merger, FCC review is generally quick and simple.358 
The FCC analyzes the transaction for compliance with its own rules and 
regulations, and it ensures that the proposed licensee is trustworthy.359 
FCC merger review should be similarly limited, and should not con-
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 note 228, at 20,576. In making this determination, the FCC con-
side
350 See Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 9, at 25; Rinner, supra note 21, at 1580–
81. 
351 See Rinner, supra note 21, at 1580–82. Holding the FCC to its own self-imposed 180-
day time limit would not solve the preliminary injunction problem because, assuming the 
DOJ and FCC review begin on the same day, the DOJ could bring suit around day sixty and 
the FCC review could then hold u
ed toward trial. See 15 U.S.C. § 18
Rinner, supra note 21, at 1574. 
352 See Feld, supra note 275, at 24. 
353 See Bradley Dugan, The FCC’s New Formula for Mergers, 29 Loy. L.A. Ent. L
 (2009); Tramont, supra note 319, at 56–57; Daniel E. Troy, Advice
CC and Communications Policy, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 503, 508 (2001). 
354 See Troy, supra note 353, at 508–09 (advocating this position). 
355 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006); Tramont, supra note 319
356 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d); Tramont, supra note 319, at 55–57. 
357 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d); Troy, supra note 353, at 509. 
358 See Dugan, supra note 353, at 445; Tramont, supra note 319, at 55–56. 
359 See EchoStar Hearing Designation Order, supra note 228, at 20,576–79; Tramont, 
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Designation Order, supra
rs the licensee’s prior felony convictions, fraudulent misrepresentations, and any viola-
tion of antitrust laws. Id. 
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sider the competitive impact of the entire transaction or speculation 
about the future effect on service quality, diversity, or other extraneous 
factors.360 In fact, in its EchoStar hearing designation order, the FCC 
explicitly considered whether the license transfer complied with exist-
ing FCC rules before moving on to the broader implications of the 
merger for competition, diversity, and spectrum policy.361 The FCC 
quickly concluded—in four pages—that the license transfer did not 
conflict with any rules and that the parties were qualified as licensees; it 
then spent twenty-five pages on public interest concerns and ninety 
age
icensing policies 
ill 
p s on competition analysis.362 If FCC review were confined to the 
material in those four pages, license transfer review would be faster, 
“nondiscriminatory, routine, and predictable.”363 
 Some within the FCC have recognized the limits of FCC statutory 
authority over mergers and the desirability of market-based approaches 
to license regulation.364 For example, former FCC Chairman Harold 
Furchtgott-Roth spoke out against the breadth of FCC merger review; 
he noted that the FCC does not have the statutory authority to review 
the entire merger transaction, and that the expansion of its authority 
creates redundancy with DOJ work and unpredictability for appli-
cants.365 Additionally, the FCC has noted the value of deferring to the 
market to determine its licensing scheme, stating, “As liberalization, 
privatization, and competition increasingly characterize wireless com-
munications policy around the world, market-based l
w play a critical role in ensuring that the benefits of telecommunica-
tions technologies and services are made available to the widest range 
of people in the most timely and efficient manner.”366 
 Nonetheless, the FCC’s expansive view of its public interest license 
transfer standard has, unfortunately, received endorsement from Con-
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issioner, supra note 318, at 15,174–89. 
llowed to duplicate DOJ antitrust review. See Telecommunications Merger Review Act, 
S. 1125, 106th Cong. (1999) (prop
 to aid in its review). 
361 EchoStar Hearing Designation Ord
–236 and accompanying text. 
362 EchoStar Hearing Designation Order, supra note 228, at 20,626–34. 
363 See Tramont, supra note 319, at 56. 
364 See infra notes 365–366 and accompanying text. 
365 Separate Statement of Comm
366 William E. Kennard, Connecting the Globe: A Regulator’s Guide to Building a Global Infor-
mation Community; FCC, at VII-5 (1999), http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/regguide.pdf. 
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gress and the courts.367 Congress, through the 1996 Act, expressly pro-
vided that the FCC should seek to encourage the enhancement of com-
petition through its policies and regulations.368 Prior judicial precedent, 
which gave the FCC discretion to interpret its statutory grant broadly 
and consider the competitive effect of the merger as a whole, poses an 
bst
proval.373 
These bills suggest that there is significant congressional support for 
reform to the dual review sy hermore, that achievement 
f th
o acle to reforming the FCC’s authority.369 Congress, therefore, must 
pass a law that imposes a strict time limit on FCC review and explicitly 
states the boundaries of this review.370 
 Although congressional reform can be difficult to achieve, there is 
a history of support for reforming telecommunications merger review 
in Congress.371 The 106th Congress introduced six different bills, four 
in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate, aimed at elimi-
nating or reducing the FCC’s role in merger review.372 The bills pro-
posed a range of options, from completely eliminating the role of the 
FCC in merger review, to subjecting the FCC to varying degrees of en-
forceable time limits (some echoing the HSR language), to limiting the 
FCC’s authority to attach conditions to license transfer ap
stem, and furt
o e moderate reforms advocated by this Note is feasible.374 
                                                                                                                      
367 Feld, supra note 275, at 22. 
368 Benjamin et al., supra note 85, at 1056–59; see Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
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order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications 
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369 See id.; Feld, supra note 275, at 22. 
370 See Feld, supra note 275, at 22; Rinner, supra note 21, at 1580. 
371 See Chen, supra note 132, at 1337; Shelanski, supra note 279, at 381. 
372 See Chen, supra note 132, at 1337; Shelanski, supra note 279, at 381; infra note 373. 
373 Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 2000, H.R. 4019, 106th Cong. (2000) 
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regulations); Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 1999, H.R. 3186, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (repealing the FCC’s Clayton Act authority and eliminating the FCC’s ability to 
condition license transfers); H.R. 2783, 106th Cong. (1999) (setting a sixty-day deadline 
for FCC review); Fairness in Telecommunications License Transfers Act of 1999, H.R. 
2533, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the Administrative Procedure Act to require the FCC 
to write rules governing license transfer proceedings); Telecommunications Merger Re-
view Act, S. 1125, 106th Cong. (1999) (repealing the FCC’s Clayton Act authority and elim-
inating FCC merger review authority except where neither the DOJ nor the FTC review the 
transaction); Expeditious Action on Telecommunications Merger Act, S. 467, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (imposing a 180-day time limit on FCC review). 
374 See supra notes 372–373 and accompanying text. 
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thority. Although none of those bills were ultimately signed into 
law, the framework and support remain. Recent publ
with the debate surrounding the AT&T/T-Mobile merger should act as 
an impetus to re-launch conversations about reform in Congress and 
finally address the problem of dual merger review in telecommunica-
tions. 
Laura Kaplan 
Conclusion 
 Concurrent FCC and DOJ review of telecommunications mergers 
simply does not make sense. Both agencies conduct an analysis of the 
effect of the mergers on competition. The agencies, furthermore, con-
duct this review under different legal standards, different burdens of 
proof, and with different guiding policies. The failed merger between 
AT&T and T-Mobile shows that under this system, neither antitrust nor 
telecommunications policy is being effectuated. Analysis of mergers 
under antitrust law should apply consistently across industries, but dual 
review prevents this from happening. Substantial reform is clearly 
needed, and curtailing the FCC’s authority to review mergers provides 
the most viable and meaningful way forward. Absent complete overhaul 
of telecommunications policy, maintaining some role for the FCC is 
necessary to ensure consistency with the 1934 Act. The 106th Congress 
considered many different reform options to rein in FCC merger re-
view au
ic engagement 
